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Abstract. We analyze a class of binary dynamic models inspired by [4] on
agents’ choices and social interaction. The main feature of our analysis is
that agents are heterogeneous, in particular their attitude to interact with
the choices of the other agents changes over time endogenously. Although
dynamic approaches to the study of models with heterogeneous agents have
been already applied in different fields, to our knowledge a complete study of
an endogenously varying population of agents has not yet been pursued. As
observed in [3], the main problem is given by the fact that with heterogeneous
agents the system may be non reversible. We address these problems, we
describe the (possible multiple) steady states of the processes involved, we
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1 Introduction
Since the ’50s, the general equilibrium theory with complete markets has con-
tributed to propagate the idea that heterogeneity was not an important issue
in economic analysis. As a matter of fact, leaving aside distribution matters,
in a complete market setting it is enough to consider a one consumer econ-
omy to address the main issues such as growth, prices, allocative efficiency,
etc. During the last two decades agents’ heterogeneity has gained a lot of at-
tention among researchers, e.g. see [6, 1, 12, 19, 13, 14, 17, 8, 11]. This is due
to many reasons. First of all, the analysis of an incomplete markets economy
with heterogeneous agents may help to explain some puzzles that are not
addressed in a one agent framework, e.g. the equity premium puzzle, trading
volume, international trade, industrial organization, etc. Moreover there are
economic and social phenomena that cannot be analyzed in a market with
a price taking setting and require a different framework, e.g., social norms,
coordination problems, industrial organization, organization decisions. In
other words economists have recognized that it is not possible to reduce so-
cial interaction to coordination by prices.
This paper contributes to the literature on social interaction. In the
spirit of [4], we analyze a class of binary choice models with interacting
agents and random utility function. In this setting a decision maker takes
a binary decision (buy or sell an asset, commit or not a crime, technology
adoption), there are many agents in the economy and the agent’s utility is
affected by what the others do, see also [2, 3, 15]. Utility is made up of
three components: a private component related to the benefit that the agent
attaches to his choice; a social component that depends upon what the agents
do and in particular on the interaction (distance) between his choice and the
average behavior of the economy; a random term that introduces noise and
bounded rationality in the model. Each agent forms his belief on the choices
of the others and decides taking this datum into account and in particular
evaluating his choice with respect to those of the community. The interaction
is captured by the social component in the utility function.
This setting allows us to capture cultural and social phenomena and forms
of social interaction: (non) conformism, herding, imitation, fashion, strategic
complementarity/substitution, herding, externalities in the decision process
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of a society. In particular the setting of [4] exhibits strategic complementar-
ities as in [9]: assuming that the agent benefits from the fact that his choice
agrees with the one of the majority of the population then we have strategic
complementarities, i.e., the marginal utility to one agent of undertaking an
action is increasing with the average action taken by the population. This
feature generates a sort of social multiplier, see [18, 15], i.e., agents’ choice
change because fundamentals change and/or the behavior of the others does.
This type of interaction generates multiple equilibria, a feature that allows
us to explain the large variation of social phenomena (think about crime or
religion) and the clustering (including segregation) of these phenomena in
the time-space dimension.
Compared to the existing literature, the main novelty of our analysis is
that we introduce agents’ heterogeneity in the social interaction attitude:
in [4] the interaction among agents is driven by the positive homogeneous
parameter, in our analysis the parameter is stochastic and change over time
allowing for conformism (positive parameter), indifference (null parameter),
anticonformism (negative parameter). Agents are heterogeneous in their de-
gree of conformism and their attitude changes over time endogenously as a
function of the behavior of the agents. We propose two different specifica-
tions on the evolution of agents’ attitude towards what the others do. In the
first specification, we have asymmetric conformism: while in [4] we have a
symmetric strategic complementarities towards both possible choices, in our
setting we have that conformism reinforces one of the two choices, i.e., (anti)
conformism is large when the majority of the population has taken one of
the two choices leading to a tendency towards that particular choice. In the
second specification instead we assume that the conformity attitude depends
on the agreement between the agent’s choice and the choices made by the
population. Compared to [4], we have that the first specification models
a sort of strategic complementarity, instead the second assumes a different
behavior.
To our knowledge, dynamically varying classes of agents have not yet
been studied in the literature. We show how to introduce this source of
complexity maintaining tractability. In particular we describe the (possible
multiple) steady states of the processes involved, discussing the similarities
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and the differences compared to its homogeneous/static counterparts. As
argued in [3, 10], heterogeneity can lead to what is called non reversibility
of the dynamical system. Reversibility is related to the shape of the genera-
tor of the stochastic processes that describes the time evolution of the state
variables of the system. It can be shown that when the system is reversible
(homogeneous) there are standard techniques useful to describe the station-
ary distributions and hence the steady states (equilibria) of the system. In
the case of heterogeneity it is not always possible to rely on such method-
ologies; in particular it has not yet been addressed in the literature whether
more complex (non reversible) models might exhibit a behavior in line with
the findings as in [3, 4].
We fully develop the analysis and we show similarities between our mod-
els and [4]. As claimed in [15], strategic complementarity is required to have
multiple equilibria. This outcome is confirmed in the first specification but
not in the second one. Moreover it is confirmed that to have multiple equi-
libria we need a small amount of noise, strong complementarities and that
the difference between the two choices is not strong.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the binary
choice problem. In Section 3 we analyze the dynamics of the dynamical
system relying upon results obtained in [10] specifying the two different set-
tings for conformity evolution and we characterize the stationary equilibria
of the model. In Section 4 we analyze the system obtained from the first
specification. In Section 5 we analyze the system obtained from the second
specification. In Section 6 we provide applications of the methodology to
crime and scientific revolution.
2 The model
Our setting is a dynamic version of the one proposed in [4]. The economy
is made up of I agents facing a discrete binary choice problem ∀t ≥ 0.
There are only two possible choices labeled by −1 and +1. We denote by
ωi(t) ∈ {−1; 1}, where i = 1, ..., I and t ≥ 0, the choice of the i− th agent at
time t and by ω(t) = (ω1(t), ..., ωI(t)) the vector of the state variables, i.e.,
agents’ decisions at time t.
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We develop our analysis in two steps. First, we concentrate our attention
on the static decision problem at time t, then we analyze the dynamics of the
entire population choices. Presenting the static problem we omit the time
indicator t.
Agents’ utility function is made up of three components: private utility,
social utility and an error term. For agent i we have
ui(ωi) = v(ωi) + Jiωim¯
e
i + ǫ(ωi). (1)
Let us analyze the three terms.
v(ωi) is the private utility associated with the binary choice. Private
utility depends upon the choice made by agent. To simplify the analysis
we assume that agents have the same private utility function, we can allow
for heterogeneity in the private utility function at the cost of computational
problems.
S(ωi, m¯
e
i ) = Jiωim¯
e
i is the social component of the utility. m¯
e
i is the
expectation from the point of view of agent i of the average of the choices of
the others: m¯ei =
1
I−1
E[
∑
j 6=i ωj]. Ji is a parameter describing the effect on
the agent’s utility of the behavior of the others: Ji > 0 implies that the agent
benefits from the fact that his choice agrees with that of the majority of the
population, we refer to this effect as conformism, i.e., the agent tends to follow
the behavior of the community as a whole, instead Ji < 0 means that the
utility of the agent is negatively affected by the fact that his choice is adopted
by the majority of the agents, we say that the agent is nonconformist. As
noted in [4], Ji > 0 captures a social component which is negatively affected
by the distance from the average behavior of the population, as a matter of
fact S(ωi, m¯
e
i ) = −
Ji
2
(ωi − m¯
e
i )
2 = Jiωim¯
e
i −
Ji
2
(1 + (m¯ei )
2), this specification
differs from the one employed in (1) only in the level but the factors affecting
the choice are already captured in our formulation.
ǫ(ωi) is a random term whose distribution is extreme value, i.e.,
P (ǫ(−1)− ǫ(1) ≤ x) =
1
1 + e−βx
(2)
where β > 0 is a measure of the impact of the random component in the
decision process. In our formulation of the choice problem, agent i knows
ǫ(−1) and ǫ(1) at the time of his decision and he chooses ωi = 1 if ui(1) >
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ui(−1). As shown in [4], a large β means that the deterministic part plays a
relevant role in the maximization of the utility; instead when β tends to zero
the error term dominates and the choice between ω = 1 or ω = −1 is a coin
tossing. The error component can be interpreted as a bounded rationality
component on the behavior of the agents introducing a noise component.
Differently from [4] and related papers, we assume that conformism (la-
beled by Ji for i = 1, ..., I) is not the same for all agents and is not constant
over time. In particular we analyze a model with two different classes of
agents with parameters J (1) and J (2). We make two different assumptions:
I) J (1) = 1 and J (2) = −1, there are conformist and nonconformist agents,
the first class of agents follow the average behavior of the population, the
second class behaves in the opposite way;
II) J (1) = 1 and J (2) = 0, there are conformist and agents indifferent to the
social behavior, following [5] we may interpret the first class of agents as
followers and the others as leaders.
Let h = 1
2
(v(1)− v(−1)). When h > 0 the choice ω = 1 leads to a higher
private value and therefore ω = 1 is risk-dominant in the sense that the agent
is more likely to change his choice if ω = −1.
At time t agent i observes his specific noise realization (ǫ(1), ǫ(−1)) and
takes the decision (−1 or 1) comparing ui(1) and ui(−1) on the basis of his
expectation on the behavior of the population (m¯ei ): if ui(1) > ui(−1) then
ωi = 1 and −1 otherwise. As the environment is stochastic the choice is not
deterministic but satisfies a probability law. Thanks to (2) it can be shown
that the agent choice obeys the probability
P (ωi| m¯
e
i ) =
eβωi(h+Jim¯
e
i)
e−βωi(h+Jim¯
e
i) + eβωi(h+Jim¯
e
i)
. (3)
The analysis of the model calls for an assumption on agents’ expectations.
We can address this issue in a static setting or introducing a dynamics. In
the first case the natural candidate is the rational expectations hypothe-
sis: agents possess homogeneous expectations on the average behavior of the
population and the expectation is self consistent: the expectations on the
average choice coincides with the realization of the economy. Utility max-
imization and rational expectations allow us to identify equilibria for the
average behavior of the population thorough a simple fixed point argument:
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with homogeneous J [4] show that the models admits one or three equilibria.
[4] address the expectation formation also in a dynamic setting: in a dis-
crete time model the expectation of the behavior of the population at time
t is given by the realized behavior at time t − 1: agents’ expectations are
backward looking and myopic. Equilibria of the difference equations system
coincide with those of the static problem with rational expectations. Note
that their equilibrium analysis cannot be replicated in our setting because Ji
are not constant.
A continuous time dynamic version of the model has been proposed in
[3]. Agents update their decisions at random Poissonian times: when the
Poissonian clock of the i−th agent rings, he takes a decision according to his
utility function and to his expectation of the others. Under this specification,
the system evolves as a continuous time Markov chain on the state space
{−1; 1}I . We can study the system dynamics and eventually the invariant
distributions that characterize the steady states and hence the equilibria of
the system.
Inspired by [3, 4], we build a dynamic decision process based on the
maximization of the utility (1). Indeed, we transpose the static probability
(3) into a dynamic varying (local) probability defined by
λi(t) = lim
τ→0
1
τ
P (ωi(t + τ) 6= ωi(t)|ω(t) ) = e
−βωi(t)(h+Ji(t)sI(t)), i = 1, . . . , I,
(4)
where now all the state variables are indexed with time and where the ex-
pectation by agent i of the behavior of the others (m¯ei ) has been substituted
by the empirical mean
sI(t) :=
1
I
I∑
i=1
ωi(t). (5)
This assumption requires all agents to share the same information at any
time, in particular they do know what is the statistical mean of the choices
of the entire population. We can also use
∑
j 6=i ωj(t) in place of sI(t), i.e.,
excluding ωi form the mean. This would only multiply all λi’s by a constant
term.
In a continuous time model, λi(t) describes the local rate of probability
that agent i changes his choice between time t and t+, given the state of the
system at time t (sI(t)).
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Why should (4) represent a dynamic counterpart of (3)? The idea behind
(4) is that the agents change their opinion at random times {τ in}n∈N such
that τ in − τ
i
n−1 are exponentially distributed with mean 1/λi. At time τ
i
n,
agent i revises his choice according to a process driven by (3).
If we compare (3) and (4), there are basically two main differences: (i)
the “minus” in the numerator and (ii) the absence of the denominator. (i)
is due to the fact that ωi has switched its sign between t and t
+, so that
−ωi in the numerator of (4) is referred to “the decision of agent i before
the jump”. Concerning (ii), the absence of the denominator simply amounts
to a re-scaling of the dynamics. In probabilistic terms the presence of the
denominator would slightly change the interpretation of the Poissonian clock:
from a “mean 1/λi time at which agent i decides to revise his decision” to
a “mean 1 time at which the agent is asked whether he wants to change his
decision”. It can be proved that the stationary states (the equilibria) of the
dynamic systems derived under the two specifications are the same.
We can rewrite (4) in a more compact way:
ωi 7→ −ωi with intensity λi = e
−βωi(h+JisI), (6)
where β > 0 and Ji ∈ {−1,+1}. The interpretation is as follows: high values
of sI imply a high probability for agent i to choose ωi = 1 when Ji = +1 and
to choose ωi = −1 when Ji = −1.
Agents change their choice at random time according to (6), the behavior
of agent i is completed by the evolution of Ji. We assume a continuous
time Markovian evolution for Ji, i = 1, ..., I, and we consider the case of
Ji = {−1, 1}, the formulation for case Ji = {0, 1} is analogous, only the
interpretation changes. In particular, we assume the following dynamics:
Ji 7→ −Ji with intensity µi = e
φ(ωi,Ji,sI), (7)
where φ(·) is a suitable function and sI is as defined in (5). We shall in
particular concentrate on two cases:
φa = −γJisI , (8)
φb = −γωiJisI , (9)
where γ is a constant.
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We notice that the i−th agent’s decision depends on the system only
through the aggregate statistic sI . This variable is indeed an empirical mean
of the system and incorporates only a partial (averaged) information on the
state vector ω. This simplifying assumption is called mean field assumption:
the interaction among different agents only depends on the value of sI .
The two specifications for the dynamics of the agent type with Ji =
{−1, 1} call for a discussion. The first one, described by (8), says that for
γ > 0 the probability that an agent switch from nonconformism (conformism)
to conformism (nonconformism) is high (low) when a large fraction of people
adopt choice 1. For γ < 0 we have the opposite effect: there is a tendency
towards conformism when a large fraction of people adopt choice −1. So
this specification allows us to describe the case in which the choices made
by the population have an asymmetric effect on the social interaction of the
agents: for γ > 0 we have a reinforcing effect towards ωi = 1, for γ < 0
towards ωi = −1. We refer to this specification as asymmetric reinforcing
conformism. The second specification, described by (9), says that for γ > 0
the probability that an agent switch from nonconformism (conformism) to
conformism (nonconformism) is high (low) when his choice agrees with the
one of the majority of the population. For γ < 0 we have the opposite effect.
So this specification allows us to describe the case in which conformism is
reinforced by the fact that the agent’s choice is confirmed or not by the
community: the fact that the agent’s choice is confirmed by the population
choice induces the agent to follow the behavior of the population. We refer
to this model as self-confirming conformism. For model (8) the conformity
attitude depends on the choices made by the population, for model (9) the
conformity attitude depends on the agreement between the agent’s choice
and the choices made by the population.
A similar interpretation can be provided in the leader-follower case. In
the first case for γ > 0 (< 0) the tendency to become a follower (leader)
increases as the fraction of people adopting ωi = 1 goes up. In the second
case for γ > 0 (< 0) the tendency to become a follower increases if the agents
choices agrees with the behavior of the entire population.
Specifications as (6)-(7) make the state space variables evolve as a continuous-
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time Markov chain on {−1, 1}2N with the following infinitesimal generator:
GIf(ω, J) = (10)
=
I∑
i=1
e−βωi(h+JisI)
(
f(ωi, J)− f(ω, J)
)
+
I∑
i=1
eφ(ωi,Ji,SI)
(
f(ω, J i)− f(ω, J)
)
where ωi (resp. J i) denotes the vector ω (resp. J) where the i−th com-
ponent has been switched:
ωij =
{
ωj for j 6= i
−ωi for j = i.
It can be shown that the dynamics induced by (10) are non-reversible
hence they do not admit a reversible stationary distribution. Usually, when
the dynamics admit a reversible distribution, this distribution can be found
explicitly relying on the so called detailed balance condition. In the case of
non-reversibility it is very difficult to find an explicit formula for the sta-
tionary distribution. As already argued, this fact makes the analysis of the
dynamics and the relative study of the equilibria more challenging. Never-
theless, we are able to describe the time evolution and the steady states of
the system in the limiting regime of the system, i.e., when the population
size tends to infinity.
3 Dynamic analysis and stationary equilibria
The study of the dynamics of the system induced by (10) is based on a law of
large numbers on a particular family of probability measures, see Appendix
A. We develop our analysis for J = {−1; 1} but results do not change in
the case {0; 1}. Before stating the main result of this section we define some
aggregate variables that will play an important role in our analysis. Let µ
be a probability on {−1; 1}2; we define the following expectations:
mωµ :=
∑
ω,J=±1
ω µ(ω, J), mJµ :=
∑
ω,J=±1
J µ(ω, J), mωJµ :=
∑
ω,J=±1
ωJ µ(ω, J).
(11)
The following Theorem provides us with the dynamical system on the
evolution of the fraction of agents choosing ωi = 1 and on the fraction of
10
agents with J = 1 in a large economy, i.e., when I →∞. We characterize the
system for the specification φa (asymmetric conformism) and φb (experience
based conformism).
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that the distribution at time t = 0 of the Markov
process (ω(t), J(t))t≥0 with generator (10) is such that the random variables
(ωi(0), Ji(0)), i = 1, . . . , I, are independent and identically distributed with
law λ.
Consider the following empirical means
sωI (t) =
1
I
∑
i
ωi(t), s
J
I :=
1
I
∑
i
Ji(t), s
ωJ
I :=
1
I
∑
i
ωi(t)Ji(t).
Then for I → ∞ the triplet (sωI (t), s
J
I (t), s
ωJ
I (t)) converges (in the sense of
weak convergence of stochastic processes) to a triplet (mω(t),mJ(t).mωJ(t))
such that
mω(0) = mωλ , m
ωJ(0) = mωJλ , m
J(0) = mJλ,
and
a) in the case of φ = φa

m˙ωt = −2C(βh)C(βm
ω
t )m
ω
t + 2C(βh)S(βm
ω
t )m
J
t
−2S(βh)S(βmωt )m
ωJ
t + 2S(βh)C(βm
ω
t )
m˙Jt = 2S(γm
ω
t )− 2C(γm
ω
t )m
J
t
m˙ωJt = 2[S(γm
ω
t )− S(βh)S(βm
ω
t )]m
ω
t + 2S(βh)C(βm
ω
t )m
J
t
−2[C(γmωt ) + C(βh)C(βm
ω
t )]m
ωJ
t + 2C(βh)S(βm
ω
t ).
(12)
where C(x) = cosh(x) and S(x) = sinh(x);
b) in the case of φ = φb

m˙ωt = −2C(βh)C(βm
ω
t )m
ω
t + 2C(βh)S(βm
ω
t )m
J
t
−2S(βh)S(βmωt )m
ωJ
t + 2S(βh)C(βm
ω
t )
m˙Jt = 2S(γm
ω
t )m
ω
t − 2C(γm
ω
t )m
J
t
m˙ωJt = −2S(βh)S(βm
ω
t )m
ω
t + 2[C(βh)S(βm
ω
t ) + S(γm
ω
t )]
+2S(βh)C(βmωt )m
J
t − 2[C(βh)C(βm
ω
t ) + C(γm
ω
t )]m
ωJ
t .
(13)
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Proof. See Appendix A.1
This theorem describes the aggregate dynamics of the triplet of sufficient
statistics when the number of agents goes to infinity. Relying on this result,
we characterize the steady states of the system.
Corollary 3.2 All the equilibria are solutions of the following fixed point
arguments:
a) in the case of φ = φa
mω = T (βh) + T (βmω)T (γmω)− T (βh)T (βmω)z(mω) (14)
where C(x) = cosh(x), S(x) = sinh(x), T (x) = tanh(x) and
z(x) =
[S(γx)− S(βh)S(βx)]x + S(βh)C(βx)T (γx) + C(βh)S(βx)
C(γx) + C(βh)C(βx)
;
b) in the case of φ = φb
mω =
T (βh)− T (βh)T (βmω)z(mω)
[1− T (βmω)T (γmω)]
(15)
where C(x) = cosh(x), S(x) = sinh(x), T (x) = tanh(x) and
z(x) =
C(βh)S(βx) + S(γx) + [S(βh)C(βx)T (γx)− S(βh)S(βx)]x
C(γx) + C(βh)C(βx)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Random utility models provide a suitable setting for multiple equilibria.
For a constant J > 0, [4] show that a unique equilibrium arises if βJ < 1,
i.e., the degree of conformism is low and there is a lot of noise in agents’
choices. For βJ > 1 and h = 0 there exist three equilibria, if h 6= 0 a unique
equilibrium arises for an h large enough in absolute value, otherwise three
equilibria exist. So multiple equilibria arises when there is a small amount
of noise, conformism is high and the deterministic part of the choice h is not
strongly in favor of one of the two choices.
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4 Asymmetric reinforcing conformism
We consider the case of φ = φa with J = {−1, 1}. We start by considering
the case h = 0 and then we will consider h 6= 0. For h = 0 the differential
system for the aggregate indicators reduces to

m˙ωt = 2S(βm
ω
t )m
J
t − 2C(βm
ω
t )m
ω
t
m˙Jt = 2S(γm
ω
t )− 2C(γm
ω
t )m
J
t
m˙ωJt = 2S(γm
ω
t )m
ω
t + 2S(βm
ω
t )− 2[C(βm
ω
t ) + C(γm
ω
t )]m
ωJ
t .
(16)
It is easy to show that the dynamics of (m˙ωt , m˙
J
t ) does not depend on m˙
ωJ
t ,
therefore the differential system (16) is essentially two dimensional: we have
to solve the two-dimensional system
(m˙ωt , m˙
J
t ) = V (m
ω
t ,m
J
t ), (17)
on [−1, 1]2 with V (x, y) = (2 sinh(βx)y−2 cosh(βx)x, 2 sinh(γx)−2y cosh(γx)),
and then the third equation (16), which is linear in mωJt .
Solutions of the system V (x, y) = 0 are
x = tanh(βx) tanh(γx) ; y = tanh(γx). (18)
We now characterize the equilibrium for h = 0.
Proposition 4.1 Let h = 0 and fix β > 0.
1. For β ≤ 1, x = 0 is the only solution to (18) whatever the value of γ
is.
2. For β > 1 define x¯(β) as the unique solution to
1 =
ℓ(x)
sinh(ℓ(x))
+
2βx
sinh(2βx)
, (19)
where ℓ(x) = ln
(
1 + x
tanh(βx)
)
− ln
(
1− x
tanh(βx)
)
. Define also
γ¯(β) =
ℓ(x¯(β))
2x¯(β)
. (20)
It can be proved that x¯(β) ∈ (0, 1) and γ¯(β) ∈ (1,∞). Moreover
(2.a) for γ < γ¯(β), x = 0 is the only solution to (18);
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(2.b) for γ = γ¯(β) there are two solutions to (18): 0 and x¯(β) > 0;
(2.c) for γ > γ¯(β) there are three solutions to (18), namely (0, x(1), x(2)),
such that 0 < x(1) < x¯(β) < x(2).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Note that for γ < 0 we reach exactly the same stationary equilibria with
x(2) < x¯(β) < x(1) < 0 and γ¯(β) < 0.
The equilibrium characterization is qualitatively in line with what is found
in [4] for the model with a constant J . More closely, in the static case we
have multiple equilibria when βJ > 1, i.e., for a high tendency towards
conformism and a small amount of noise. In our model we confirm that a
small amount of noise (β > 1) is necessary to find out multiple equilibria.
The role of J is played by γ: for γ high enough we have three equilibria.
For a comparison among situations where unique or multiple equilibria are
found, see Figure 1 where we plot the graph of f(x) = tanh(βx) tanh(γx) for
different values of γ.
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Equilibrium points for different values of the parameters 
Figure 1: Solutions of (18) for β fixed and different values of γ. Here β = 3
and γ = 0.8; 1.238; 1.438 respectively in the dash, solid and dash-dot lines.
In this example γ¯(β) ∼ 1.238 represents the critical value. The ‘∗’marked
point corresponds to x¯(β) as defined in Proposition 4.1.
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β γ¯(β) x¯(β)
2 1.509 0.624
3 1.238 0.544
5 1.103 0.417
10 1.035 0.268
Table 1: Different values of γ¯(β) and x¯(β) when β varies.
Notice also that γ(β) is a decreasing function of β. In Table 1 we report
some values of γ¯ varying β as found by numerical simulations.
Concerning the case of h 6= 0, we can distinguish different situations:
• for β < 1 or β > 1 but γ ≤ γ(β), there is one unique solution to (14)
which equals h in sign;
• for β > 1 and γ > γ¯(β), there exist two thresholds hl(β, γ) and hu(β, γ),
where h−(β, γ) < 0 < h+(β, γ) such that
– for h < hl(β, γ) there is only a negative solution x(h) to (14). In
particular, limh→−∞ x(h) = −1;
– for hl(β, γ) ≤ h ≤ hu(β, γ) there are three solutions to(14);
– for h > hu(β, γ) there is only a positive solution x(h) to (14)). In
particular, limh→+∞ x(h) = 1.
Random utility models are static models. Further assumptions are re-
quired to introduce a dynamics: in our setting we have introduced a dynam-
ics through Poissonian random clocks, [4] make the assumption of myopic
expectations. Stability results are similar: if there exists a unique equilib-
rium then it is stable, if there three equilibria then the extreme equilibria are
stable. We prove this result for the case h = 0 in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 Consider the equilibria found in Proposition 4.1, then
i) x = 0 is always a linearly stable equilibrium of (18).
ii) x¯(β) is still stable but it has a neutral direction.
iii) x(1) is a saddle point and x(2) is linearly stable.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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5 Self-confirming conformism
We consider the case of φ = φb with J = {−1, 1}. We start by considering
the case h = 0 and then we will consider h 6= 0. For h = 0 it is easy to see
that (15) reduces to mω = 0. Then we have only one (stable equilibrium)
whatever the values of β and γ are. Concerning the case h 6= 0, looking at
the simulations, it seems that the solution of (15) is always unique and its
sign coincides with the sign of h.
6 Applications: development of crime rates
The framework described above covers a large set of applications. We an-
alyze in particular crime rates in a society considering a model similar to
[17]. Empirical data show that crime is a phenomenon characterized by a
high variability that cannot be fully explained by sociological and economic
factors. To explain variability, models with multiple equilibria have been
invoked: [21, 20] suggest two simple self-reinforcing mechanisms, i.e., as the
criminal fraction of the population increases the probability of being arrested
decreases and the returns from not being a criminal fall because revenues are
stolen by criminals. [17] instead build on a model based on imitation among
agents: there are agents with a firm opinion about crime (inclined to crime
or not), their choice is not affected by others factors, and there are agents
who based their decision on what the others do. A large fraction of agents
with no firm choice leads to a high crime variance.
There are I agents, ωi = 1 means that agent i commits a crime, instead
ωi = −1 means that the agent does not commit a crime. The two specifica-
tions on the evolution of J , i.e., (8) and (9), and the choice of possible values
for J , i.e., {−1, 1} and {0, 1}, provide us with different modeling of the crime
phenomenon.
Assuming (8) with J = {−1, 1} and γ > 0, agent i is more likely to
change from anticonformism to conformism, and so to imitate the others, if
the majority of the population commits a crime or to change from conformism
to anticonformism if the majority of the population doesn’t commit a crime.
The idea behind this behavioral assumption is that there is a self reinforcing
mechanism towards crime. This idea, with a different motivation, agrees
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with [21, 20]. Assuming J = {0, 1} we have that the fraction of the people
affected by the decisions of the others increases as crime goes up and the
interpretation is similar to the one described above. With γ < 0 we have
exactly the opposite effect: a self reinforcing mechanism towards a probe
behavior.
Assuming (9) with J = {−1, 1} and γ > 0, agent i is more likely to
change from anticonformism to conformism if the majority of the population
commits a crime and he commits a crime. The idea behind this behavioral
assumption is that the agent’s degree of conformity is positively influenced by
the fact that his choice agrees with the one of the majority of the population.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a class of binary dynamic models inspired by
[4] on agents’ choices and social interaction. The main feature of our analysis
is that agents are heterogeneous, in particular their attitude to interact with
the choices of the other agents changes over time endogenously. We have
concentrated our attention on two different specifications on the evolution
of agents’ attitude towards what the others do. In the first specification,
we have asymmetric conformism: while in [4] we have a symmetric strategic
complementarities towards both possible choices, in our setting we have that
conformism reinforces one of the two choices, i.e., (anti) conformism is large
when the majority of the population has taken one of the two choices leading
to a tendency towards that particular choice. In the second specification
instead we assumed that the conformity attitude depends on the agreement
between the agent’s choice and the choices made by the population.
To our knowledge, dynamically varying classes of agents have not yet
been studied in the literature. We have proposed a methodology in order to
introduce this source of complexity but maintaining tractability. In particu-
lar we have described the (possible multiple) steady states of the processes
involved, discussing the similarities and the differences compared to its ho-
mogeneous/static counterparts.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
In order to prove Theorem 3.1, we need to develop a suitable law of large
numbers on a particular family of probability measures.
In what follows we shall denote with (ωi[0, T ], Ji[0, T ]) the trajectory on
[0, T ] of the state indicators of the i-th agent. We also denote with D([0, T ])
the Skorohod space of (discontinuous) trajectories on [0, T ] endowed with the
weak topology. With the notation M1(X) we denote the space of probability
measures on X.
Let (ωi[0, T ], Ji[0, T ])
I
i=1 ∈ D([0, T ])
2I denote a path of the system process
in the time-interval [0, T ] for a generic T > 0. We define the so called
empirical measure of the I−dimensional system as
ρI =
1
I
I∑
i=1
δ(ωi[0,T ],Ji[0,T ]). (21)
We may think of ρI as a (random) element of M1(D([0, T ])×D([0, T ])), the
space of probability measures on D([0, T ])×D([0, T ]) endowed with the weak
convergence topology.
Let now q be any probability measure on {−1; 1}2. Define
mωq :=
∑
ω,J=±1
ω q(ω, J),
that can be interpreted as the average choice of any agent under q. The main
result of this subsection is the following.
Theorem A.1 Suppose that the distribution at time t = 0 of the Markov
process (ω(t), J(t))t≥0 with generator (10) is such that the random variables
(ωi(0), Ji(0)), i = 1, . . . , I, are independent and identically distributed with
law λ. Then there exists a probability Q∗ ∈ M1(D([0, T ]) × D([0, T ])) such
that
ρI → Q
∗ almost surely
in the weak topology. Moreover, if qt ∈ M1({−1; 1}
2) denotes the marginal
distribution of Q∗ at time t, then qt is the unique solution of the nonlinear
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(McKean-Vlasov) equation{
∂qt
∂t
= Lqt, t ∈ [0, T ]
q0 = λ
(22)
where
Lq(ω, J) = ∇ω
[
e−βω(h+Jm
ω
q )q(ω, J)
]
+∇J
[
eφ(ω,J,m
ω
q )q(ω, J)
]
(23)
with (ω, J) ∈ {−1, ; 1}2 and where ∇xf(x, y) = f(−x, y)− f(x, y).
Proof. See [10]. Notice that the theorem can be applied to both the speci-
fications described by (8) and (9) and for J ∈ {−1, 1} and J ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
By Theorem A.1, we know that ρI → Q
∗ in the weak topology. As a conse-
quence∫
f(ω[0, T ], J [0, T ])ρI(dω[0, T ], dJ [0, T ]) →
∫
f(ω[0, T ], J [0, T ])Q∗(dω[0, T ], dJ [0, T ]).
We can also consider a projection at time t ∈ [0, T ], choosing a function f(·)
of ω(t) and J(t). Indeed∫
f(ω(t), J(t))ρI(dω[0, T ], dJ [0, T ]) →
∫
f(ω(t), J(t))Q∗(dω[0, T ], dJ [0, T ]).
The latter can be rewritten as
1
I
I∑
i=1
f(ωi(t), Ji(t)) →
∑
ω,J=±1
f(ω, J)qt(ω, J),
where qt solves (22).
If we now choose f(ω, J) = ω we have that 1
I
∑I
i=1 f(ωi(t), Ji(t)) = s
ω
I (t). In
the same way, choosing f(ω, J) = J we obtain sJI (t) and for f(ω, J) = ωJ
we have sωJI (t).
The theorem is thus proved if we show that
∑
ω,J=±1
ωqt(ω, J) = m
ω
t ,
∑
ω,J=±1
Jqt(ω, J) = m
J
t ,
∑
ω,J=±1
ωJqt(ω, J) = m
ωJ
t ;
(24)
where (mωt , m
J
t , m
ωJ
t ) solves (12) (or (13)) when φ = φ
a (φ = φb).
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Case φ = φa:
Consider mωt =
∑
ω,J ωqt(ω, J), hence m˙
ω
t =
∑
ω,J ωq˙t(ω, J). Relying on (23)
we then have
m˙ωt =
∑
ω,J
ω
(
∇ω[e−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J)] +∇
J
[
e−γJm
ω
t qt(ω, J)
])
=
=
∑
ω,J
ω
(
eβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J)− e
−βω(h+Jmωt )qt(ω, J)
)
+
+
∑
ω,J
ω
(
eγJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J)− e
−γJmωt qt(ω, J)
)
.
We now use the following facts
∑
ω,J
ωeβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J) = −
∑
ω,J
ωe−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J),
∑
ω,J
ωeγJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J) =
∑
ω,J
ωe−γJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
So that
m˙ωt = −2
∑
ω,J
ωe−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J) = −2
∑
ω,J
ωe−βωhe−βωJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
Moreover, it is easy to check that for ω, J ∈ {−1; 1}, it holds
e−βωh = −ω
eβh − e−βh
2
+
eβh + e−βh
2
,
e−βωJm
ω
t = −ωJ
eβm
ω
t − e−βm
ω
t
2
+
eβm
ω
t + e−βm
ω
t
2
.
Thus, using the definition of sinh(x) = e
x−e−x
2
and cosh(x) = e
x+e−x
2
, we have
m˙ωt = −2
∑
ω,J
ω[−ω sinh(βh)+cosh(βh)][−ωJ sinh(βmωt )+cosh(βm
ω
t )]qt(ω, J)
= −2
∑
ω,J
[− sinh(βh) + ω cosh(βh)][−ωJ sinh(βmωt ) + cosh(βm
ω
t )]qt(ω, J);
where we have used the fact that ω2 = 1. The product into the [ ]-brackets
gives
ωJ sinh(βh) sinh(βmωt )− sinh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )
−J cosh(βh) sinh(βmωt ) + ω cosh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t ).
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Thus
m˙ωt = −2 sinh(βh) sinh(βm
ω
t )m
ωJ
t + 2 sinh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )
+2 cosh(βh) sinh(βmωt )m
J
t − 2 cosh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )m
ω
t ,
where we have used (11). We use the same approach to compute m˙Jt and
m˙ωJt .
m˙Jt =
∑
ω,J
J
(
eβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J)− e
−βω(h+Jmωt )qt(ω, J)
)
+
+
∑
ω,J
J
(
eγJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J)− e
−γJmωt qt(ω, J)
)
.
Arguing as before we see that
∑
ω,J
Jeβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J) =
∑
ω,J
Je−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J),
∑
ω,J
JeγJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J) = −
∑
ω,J
Je−γJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
So that
m˙Jt = −2
∑
ω,J
Je−γJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
Moreover, it is easy to check that for ω, J ∈ {−1; 1}, it holds
e−γJm
ω
t = −J
eγm
ω
t − e−γm
ω
t
2
+
eγm
ω
t + e−γm
ω
t
2
,
Thus
m˙Jt = −2
∑
ω,J
J [−J sinh(γmωt ) + cosh(γm
ω
t )]qt(ω, J)
= 2 sinh(γmωt )− 2 cosh(γm
ω
t )m
J
t .
Concerning mωJ we have
m˙ωJt =
∑
ω,J
ωJ
(
eβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J)− e
−βω(h+Jmωt )qt(ω, J)
)
+
+
∑
ω,J
ωJ
(
eγJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J)− e
−γJmωt qt(ω, J)
)
.
= −2
∑
ω,J
ωJe−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J)− 2
∑
ω,J
ωJe−γJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
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Thus
m˙ωJt = −2 sinh(βh) sinh(βm
ω
t )m
ω
t + 2 sinh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )m
J
t
+2 cosh(βh) sinh(βmωt )− 2 cosh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )m
ωJ
t
+2 sinh(γmωt )m
ω
t − 2 cosh(γm
ω
t )m
ωJ
t .
Case φ = φb:
Arguing as before we have
m˙ωt =
∑
ω,J
ω
(
∇ω[e−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J)] +∇
J
[
e−γωJm
ω
t qt(ω, J)
])
=
=
∑
ω,J
ω
(
eβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J)− e
−βω(h+Jmωt )qt(ω, J)
)
+
+
∑
ω,J
ω
(
eγωJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J)− e
−γωJmωt qt(ω, J)
)
.
We now use the following facts∑
ω,J
ωeβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J) = −
∑
ω,J
ωe−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J),
∑
ω,J
ωeγωJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J) =
∑
ω,J
ωe−γωJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
So that
m˙ωt = −2
∑
ω,J
ωe−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J) = −2
∑
ω,J
ωe−βωhe−βωJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
Thus
m˙ωt = −2 sinh(βh) sinh(βm
ω
t )m
ωJ
t + 2 sinh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )
+2 cosh(βh) sinh(βmωt )m
J
t − 2 cosh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )m
ω
t ,
We use the same approach to compute m˙Jt and m˙
ωJ
t .
m˙Jt =
∑
ω,J
J
(
eβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J)− e
−βω(h+Jmωt )qt(ω, J)
)
+
+
∑
ω,J
J
(
eγωJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J)− e
−γωJmωt qt(ω, J)
)
.
Arguing as before we see that∑
ω,J
Jeβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J) =
∑
ω,J
Je−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J),
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∑
ω,J
JeγωJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J) = −
∑
ω,J
Je−γωJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
So that
m˙Jt = −2
∑
ω,J
Je−γωJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
Moreover, it is easy to check that for ω, J ∈ {−1; 1}, it holds
e−γωJm
ω
t = −ωJ
eγm
ω
t − e−γm
ω
t
2
+
eγm
ω
t + e−γm
ω
t
2
,
Thus
m˙Jt = −2
∑
ω,J
J [−ωJ sinh(γmωt ) + cosh(γm
ω
t )]qt(ω, J)
= 2 sinh(γmωt )m
ω
t − 2 cosh(γm
ω
t )m
J
t .
Concerning mωJ we have
m˙ωJt =
∑
ω,J
ωJ
(
eβω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(−ω, J)− e
−βω(h+Jmωt )qt(ω, J)
)
+
+
∑
ω,J
ωJ
(
eγωJm
ω
t qt(ω,−J)− e
−γωJmωt qt(ω, J)
)
.
= −2
∑
ω,J
ωJe−βω(h+Jm
ω
t )qt(ω, J)− 2
∑
ω,J
ωJe−γωJm
ω
t qt(ω, J).
Thus
m˙ωJt = −2 sinh(βh) sinh(βm
ω
t )m
ω
t − 2 sinh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )m
J
t
+2 cosh(βh) sinh(βmωt )− 2 cosh(βh) cosh(βm
ω
t )m
ωJ
t
+2 sinh(γmωt )− 2 cosh(γm
ω
t )m
ωJ
t .
Proof of Corollary 3.2.
We set (m˙ωt , m˙
J
t , m˙
ωJ
t ) = (0, 0, 0). We immediately see that m
J
t = tanh(γm
ω
t ).
The third equation is linear in mωJt so we can write it in the form m
ωJ
t =
F (mωt ). It is easy to verify that F (·) = z(·) where z(·) is defined in (14).
Then we substitute F and mJt = tanh(γm
ω
t ) into the first of (14). Reasoning
in the same way we prove also (15).
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A.2 Proof of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
Notice that x = tanh(βx) tanh(γx) is a fixed point argument and that x = 0
is always solution. Moreover, being tanh(βx) tanh(γx) ≥ 0 the possible
solutions of (18) can not be negative.
Consider now the case β ≤ 1. Then it is easy to see that x > tanh(βx)
for all x > 0. Thus, being tanh(γx) ≤ 1 for all x, tanh(γx) = x/ tanh(βx)
can not admit strictly positive solutions. This proves point 1.
Consider β > 1. We want to show the existence of γ(β) (called γ¯ for
brevity) such that (18) has a (unique) positive solution. To this aim, notice
that for very small values of γ, the graph of g(x) = tanh(βx) tanh(γx) lays
always below f(x) = x for positive x; as a consequence x = 0 is the only
solution to (18). To characterize γ¯ we use a continuity argument: we con-
jecture that there exists a unique γ¯ for which the following system admits a
unique solution x¯(β) ∈ (0, 1):{
x = tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x)
1 = 2βx
sinh(2βx)
+ 2γ¯x
sinh(2γ¯x)
(25)
The second equation says that d
dx
tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x)|x=x¯(β) = 1, hence the
curve is tangent to the straight line f(x) = x in the point x¯(β). Looking at
the concavity of the function tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x) (convex up to some positive
x and then concave) this amounts in showing that x¯(β) is the only positive
solution to (18) and that γ¯ is the lowest value for which such a positive
solution to (18) does actually exist. We shall now prove this conjecture
where moreover γ¯ and x¯(β) are as defined in the statement of the theorem.
Then (2.a) and (2.b) immediately follow.
β > 1 implies that there exists z ∈ (0, 1) such that tanh(βz) = z. More-
over, tanh(βx) > x for all 0 < x < z. We recall that for small values of
γ, tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x) < x for all x > 0. On the other hand, for γ → ∞,
tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x) tends to tanh(βx). As a consequence, for γ large enough
there must exist x > 0 such that tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x) > x. This implies that
there is a threshold value of γ¯ for which the graph of tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x) is
tangent to f(x) = x. The tangent point is exactly x¯. The couple (γ¯, x¯) is the
only solution to (25). Solving the first equation in (25) for γ gives (20), where
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ℓ(x) = 2 tanh−1( x
tanh(βx)
). Substituting then in the second, it gives (19). It re-
mains to prove that γ¯ > 1 and x¯ < 1. If γ¯ ≤ 1 then x/ tanh(γ¯x) > 1 and (18)
could not admit positive solutions. Concerning the latter, it is easy to see
that tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x) < tanh(βx). Thus x¯ < z < 1, where z = tanh(βz)
has been defined before. This concludes the proof of (2.a) and (2.b).
To prove (2.c) it is enough to notice that for γ > γ¯(β) there are x ∈ (0, 1)
that lie above the curve f(x) = x and thus necessarily we have two positive
solutions x(1) < x(2) < 1 to (18). Since for γ > γ¯, tanh(βx) tanh(γx) >
tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x), we immediately see that x(1) < x¯(β) < x(2).
Proof of Proposition 4.2.
The matrix of the linearized system is
DV (x, y) = 2
(
β cosh(βx)y − β sinh(βx)x− cosh(βx) sinh(βx)
γ cosh(γx)− γ sinh(γx)y − cosh(γx)
)
,
where (x, y) solve (18).
When (x, y) = (0, 0) it is easy to see that the two eigenvalues of DV (0, 0) are
negative, thus the equilibrium is linearly stable and this proves point (i).
When (x, y) is non zero, it can be shown that the matrix DV (x, y) can be
rewritten as
DV (x, y) = 2
(
βx
sinh(βx)
− cosh(βx) sinh(βx)
γ
cosh(γx)
− cosh(γx)
)
,
After some algebraic computations one shows that
det(DV (x, y)) =
2
cosh(γx) cosh(βx)
[
1−
2βx
sinh(2βx)
−
2γx
sinh(2γx)
]
. (26)
In the case of γ = γ¯(β), x = x¯(β) we have det(DV (x, y)) = 0 by equation
(25). Hence in this case λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 2 · Tr(DV (x, y)). We have
Tr((DV (x, y)) =
βx
sinh(βx)
− cosh(βx)− cosh(γx).
Notice that βx
sinh(βx)
< 1 < cosh(βx) then the trace is negative. This implies
that there is a critical direction and a stable direction and this proves (ii).
When γ > γ¯(β), we have two positive equilibria, x(1) and x(2) . Look
at (26). We recall that 2βx
sinh(2βx)
+ 2γx
sinh(2γx)
= d
dx
tanh(βx) tanh(γx). Thus
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det(DV (x, y)) < 0 if and only if d
dx
tanh(βx) tanh(γ¯x) > 1, and this happens
in x(1). As a consequence x(1) is certainly unstable since det(DV (x, y)) =
λ1λ2 < 0 and then one of the eigenvalues is positive. Concerning x
(2), we
have det(DV (x, y)) > 0. The eigenvalues have thus the same sign, in partic-
ular sign(λ) = sign(tr(DV (x, y))). Since the sign of the trace is negative,
x(2) is stable.
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